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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 12-2946 
______________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
KEITH CANYON, 
  Appellant 
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. No. 5-09-cr-00188-001) 
District Judge: Mitchell S. Goldberg 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 12, 2013 
______________ 
 
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., SHWARTZ, and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: July 25, 2013) 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 Appellant Keith Canyon pled guilty to charges arising from his participation in 
two armed bank robberies and obstruction of justice as well as pleading nolo contendere 
  
2 
 
to witness tampering.  The District Court imposed a sentence of 200 months.  Canyon 
appealed his sentence.  We will dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 
I. 
 As we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we recite only the essential 
facts and procedural history.  Canyon robbed the same bank in Reading, Pennsylvania on 
November 27, 2007, and March 19, 2008.  Canyon was indicted on two counts of armed 
bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d), and two counts of using and carrying a 
firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(c)(1).  
 After he was indicted, Canyon sent a letter to his former girlfriend in which he 
warned her not to speak to government agents.  Based on the letter, the grand jury 
returned a superseding indictment that included the bank robbery and firearm charges and 
added charges for obstruction of justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a) and witness 
tampering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3).  The government later moved to 
dismiss the firearm count arising from one of the bank robberies.  Canyon subsequently 
pled guilty to the three remaining counts relating to the bank robberies and to the 
obstruction of justice charge, and he pled nolo contendere to the witness tampering 
charge.  
 Before sentencing, Canyon filed a sentencing memorandum moving for, among 
other things, a downward departure based on: (1) his mental and emotional condition, 
including attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”) and neurological deficits, 
pursuant to U.S.S.G. §§ 5H1.3 and 5K2.0; (2) his experience of childhood abuse and 
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neglect, including his absent father, abusive stepfather, and experience of violence, 
pursuant to U.S.S.G. §§ 5H1.3 and 5K2.0; and (3) the combination of those 
circumstances.  In the alternative, he sought a variance on the same grounds. 
 The District Court held sentencing hearings on June 6, 2012 and July 3, 2012.  
Canyon presented testimony from Eric Mercer, a social worker and “mitigation 
specialist,” and Dr. Kirk Heilbrun, an expert psychologist.  Based on his interviews with 
Canyon and Canyon‟s relatives, Mr. Mercer described Canyon‟s underprivileged 
background and difficult childhood.  Dr. Heilbrun testified to Canyon‟s low cognitive 
functioning, hostility, paranoid ideation, and impulse control difficulties, and 
recommended psychotherapeutic intervention and possibly medication.  The government 
presented the testimony of the assistant manager of the bank that Canyon had twice 
robbed and Canyon‟s accomplice.  Canyon also testified.  The Court found that Canyon‟s 
offense level was 30
1
 and he had a criminal history category of IV, which resulted in an 
advisory guideline range of 219 to 252 months.   
 Canyon‟s counsel then simultaneously argued his motion for a departure or a 
variance, noting “I think we can all acknowledge that something could be a variance or 
could be a departure and the arguments would be the same.”  App. 234.  After the 
government responded to Canyon‟s arguments, the District Court denied the departure 
motion but granted a downward variance of 19 months, and imposed a sentence of 200 
months. 
                                              
 
1
 The District Court found that Canyon had not accepted responsibility for his 
crimes and therefore was not entitled to a two-point reduction in the guidelines 
calculation. 
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 Defendant now appeals his sentence, arguing that the District Court “erred as a 
matter of law in effectively concluding that it lacked authority to depart downward,” 
Appellant Br. 21, and therefore “failed to conduct the appropriate discretionary review of 
the evidence.”  Id. at 23, 25.  He contends that the Court should have granted a downward 
departure based on: (1) his “extraordinary mental and emotional conditions,” including 
his ADHD, neurological deficits caused by traumatic brain injury, and the exacerbating 
effects of the physical abuse and neglect he suffered as a child, id. at 23-25; and (2) the 
“presence of extraordinary childhood neglect and abuse,” id. at 25-28. 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  Our jurisdiction 
“depends on the basis for the district court‟s ruling.”  United States v. Stevens, 223 F.3d 
239, 247 (3d Cir. 2000).  If we determine that the Court‟s denial of the departure motion 
was discretionary, we will dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because “we are not 
at liberty to review a discretionary denial.”  United States v. Lofink, 564 F.3d 232, 240 
(3d Cir. 2009); see also United States v. Jackson, 467 F.3d 834, 839 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[A]s 
it was pre-Booker, courts of appeals post-Booker, have no authority to review 
discretionary denials of departure motions in calculating sentencing ranges.”).2  Thus, we 
must first determine whether the Court denied the motion based on its exercise of 
                                              
 
2
 We necessarily exercise de novo review of an argument that we lack appellate 
jurisdiction.  Montanez v. Thompson, 603 F.3d 243, 248 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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discretion, or if instead the Court believed the law barred it from granting the motion.  
Lofink, 564 F.3d at 240.
 3 
III. 
 We examine the entire record, not just the court‟s words, to determine if the 
sentencing court was exercising its discretion when it denied the motion for departure.  
Jackson, 467 F.3d at 839.  In this case, while the District Court did not expressly say so, 
the record shows that the District Court‟s denial of the downward departure motion was 
the result of its exercise of discretion.  See id. at 840 (We “infer meaning from the 
District Court‟s actions in [the] circumstance.”).  First, “[t]here is nothing . . . to indicate 
that the Court was acting under the mistaken belief that it lacked the discretion to reduce 
the [offense level] under the evidence before it.”  United States v. Jones, 566 F.3d 353, 
366 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Second, the Court stated its 
decision on departure in discretionary—not compulsory—terms: “And I have certainly 
taken into consideration the Guidelines, the variances and departures.  I‟m not going to 
grant a departure.  Those [motions] are denied.”  App. 248.  Third, the Court‟s actions 
reflect its awareness of its discretionary authority.  The Court heard extensive testimony 
on the subject matter of the motion, thoroughly analyzed the evidence relevant to a 
departure and a variance, recognized that both were sought, and concluded that a 
                                              
 
3
 A departure is “the altering of a Guidelines range . . . based on reasons provided 
by the Guidelines themselves.”  Lofink, 564 F.3d at 238 n.14 (internal citation omitted).  
By contrast, a divergence from the final Guidelines range based on the factors listed in 
section 3553(a) is called a “variance.”  Id. 
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downward departure from the advisory guidelines was not appropriate, but that a variance 
from the advisory guideline sentence based upon section 3553(a) was warranted. 
 Fourth, the parties informed the District Court of its authority to depart.  See 
Jackson, 467 F.3d at 840 (holding that when the Government implicitly recognized the 
Judge‟s discretion by arguing that a defendant had not shown extraordinary acceptance of 
responsibility, “[t]his was enough for the Judge to have recognized the possibility of a 
departure in calculating the Guidelines range on the basis of [the defendant‟s] acceptance 
of responsibility.”); cf. United States v. Mummert, 34 F.3d 201, 205 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(“Since . . . the government apparently acknowledged at the time of sentencing[ ] that a 
downward departure for „diminished capacity‟ is permissible under some circumstances, 
it seems quite likely that the district court‟s refusal to depart on this ground was 
discretionary.”).  During the sentencing hearing, defense counsel twice expressly 
discussed the Court‟s discretion under the Sentencing Guidelines.4  Defendant‟s 
sentencing memorandum also clearly stated that the Court had discretion to depart 
downward.  Implicitly acknowledging the Court‟s discretion to depart, the Government 
contended that the factors Canyon argued warranted a departure in fact demonstrated that 
“Mr. Canyon‟s prospects for [rehabilitation in] the future are, indeed, dim,” and therefore 
a Guideline sentence was appropriate.  App. 242.  Cf. Lofink, 564 F.3d at 240 (vacating a 
sentence where the court could not infer from the record whether the district court‟s 
                                              
 
4
 Canyon stated that the District Court was “permitted to do anything under the 
Guidelines.  The Guidelines are now advisory . . . .”  App. 204.  Later, Canyon 
acknowledged, “Your Honor[] may say that [Canyon‟s intellectual ability] has nothing to 
do with sentencing and that‟s fine.  That‟s Your Honor‟s . . . discretion as the Judge.”  
App. 207-08. 
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denial of a departure motion was discretionary, in part because “the government . . . 
argued to the District Court that [the defendant] was not eligible for [the] departure”). 
 In short, we can infer that the District Court was aware of its discretionary 
authority and exercised its discretion in declining to depart.  Because we conclude that 
the Court was aware of its authority to depart and exercised its discretion not to do so, we 
are not “at liberty” to review its discretionary decision.  Id. 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 
